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Human eggs for basic, fertility and stem-cell research are in short supply. Many experiments 
that require their use cannot be carried out at present, and, therefore, the benefits that could 
emerge from these are either delayed or never materialise. This state of affairs is problematic 
for scientists and patients worldwide, and it is a matter that needs our attention. Recent 
advances in chimera research have opened the possibility of creating human/non-human animal 
chimeras intended for human gamete production (chimeras-IHGP). In this paper, I examine 
four arguments against the creation of such chimeras and prove that all of them are found 




Different strategies have been proposed for increasing the supply of human eggs for research 
purposes: compensating women for egg donation, obtaining human eggs from aborted fetuses, 
posthumous egg donation, and in-vitro gametogenesis. Serious research efforts are dedicated 
to in-vitro gametogenesis at the moment (Hendriks et al., 2015). Each of these options, 
however, is faced with different ethical dilemmas and regulatory constraints (Baylis, 2009; 
Ellison and Meliker, 2011; Greely, 2016).  
One possible avenue for solving the egg shortage problem is to create human/non-human 
animal chimeras intended for human gamete production (chimeras-IHGP). One way in which 
this can be achieved is through interspecies blastocyst complementation. In this technique, a 
non-human animal blastocyst is obtained from a mutant strain in which ‘a gene critical for the 
development of a particular lineage is disabled’ (Wuet al., 2016, 2017). Afterwards, this 
blastocyst is complemented with human stem cells, which will compensate for the existing 
niche. 
Despite ongoing research and scientific and ethical discussions about the development of 





purposes, no wide discussion of the possibility of creating chimeras-IHGP has taken place. 
Scientists have only discussed how to avoid creating chimeras capable of producing human 
gametes (Rashid et al., 2014). A possible explanation for this is that many scientists consider 
that developing such chimeras is so ‘ethically and politically problematic’, that it is not even 
worth discussing this option. For example, Rashid et al. (2014), while discussing interspecies 
complementation for organ generation, have stated that: 
 
[We are] sensitive to the fact that research with the potential to present the following 
hypothetical scenarios warrants particularly thorough consideration prior to 
commencement. (. . .) (2) Situations wherein functional human gametes (eggs or sperm) 
might develop from precursor cell types in an animal, and where fertilization between 
either human (or human-derived) gametes and animal gametes might then occur. 
(Rashid et al., 2014, p. 408) 
In order to avoid the above, scientists are developing methods of target-organ generation that 
would preclude the accidental generation of human gametes within human/non-human animal 
chimeras (Kobayashi et al., 2015; Rashid et al., 2014). Owing to space constraints in this paper, 
I only discuss creating chimeras-IHGP for obtaining human gametes for research purposes. 
The ethical issues concerning use of chimera-generated human gametes for reproductive 
purposes, just as with in-vitro generated gametes for reproductive purposes, are important and 
need further exploration. For an up-to-date review of the scientific state of in-vitro 
gametogenesis, see Hendriks et al. (2015); for an up-to-date review of the ethics debate on in-
vitro gametogenesis, see Smajdor and Cutas (2015) and Segers et al. (2017).  
At this point, we must ask: why might developing chimeras-IHGP be so morally problematic 
that it should not be attempted? Four arguments against the creation of chimeras IHGP seem 
promising: human dignity would be violated by their creation; the value of human gametes 
would be debased by being generated within chimeras; generating such creatures is problematic 
because a human, or hybrid, pregnancy could ensue; and the research benefits of using such 
gametes do not outweigh the harms (death or pain) that the chimera would suffer. In what 
follows, I assess these arguments and show that they are found wanting, and then present an 
argument in favour of creating such type of chimera. 
Human Dignity 
Appeals to human dignity when objecting to new biomedical research are common. It, 
therefore, seems natural that some may claim that the creation of chimeras-IHGP would 
constitute a violation of human dignity, and consequently that such creatures should not be 
created. The problem with this position is that it is not at all clear how human dignity could be 
violated by the mere creation of such creatures, as the claim that the creation of any human/non-
human animal chimera (of which chimeras-IHGP are a subset) inherently violates human 
dignity is just false. We do not consider that the existence of a NOG mouse with engrafted 
human cells violates human dignity, even when it is a human/mouse chimera. Neither, do we 
consider that human dignity is violated when someone receives a pig heart valve, which 
effectively turns them into a chimera. 
A more charitable reading of this kind of argument would rest upon the claim that creating a 
chimera-IHGP would create a being with human dignity. Therefore, it may be claimed that 
given this, and the belief that creatures in possession of a dignity ought not be used merely as 
a means to an end, chimeras IHGP should not be created. If this is what it is meant, then what 
would actually follow is that how we treat such creatures determines whether their dignity is 
violated, or not (Palacios-González, 2015a). From this position, it would also follow that we 
have the same moral obligations towards such chimeras as we have towards other human 
persons. If human dignity is tied to the possession of certain higher mental capacities, then as 
long as the chimeras-IHGP lack them, there would be no danger of violating their human 
dignity, as they would not possess it in the first place. Precluding the generation of human brain 
cells through genetic engineering, a strategy examined by Rashid et al. (2014), when creating 
chimeras-IHGP would highly reduce the possibility of accidentally creating a chimera with 
human brain cells. Therefore, as long as the chimeras-IHGP that we create do not possess 
higher mental capacities, it is simply not true that creatures with human dignity would be 
created, and even less that human dignity would be violated. 
The value of human gametes 
It may also be argued that chimeras-IHGP ought not be created because to do so would debase 
the value of human gametes. In order to answer this question, we first need to specify the kind 
of value that human gametes possess. Human gametes could possess two different types of 
value: inherent value or instrumental value. This means that they could be valuable in 
themselves or that they could be valuable as a means to achieve others’ ends (Palacios-
González, 2015b). 
To defend the proposition that human gametes have intrinsic value is to assert that they have 
interests, that we have obligations towards them, and that the obligations we have towards them 
are based, at least partly, on their interests (DeGrazia, 2008). This position is implausible. What 
interests could a gamete have? To create an embryo? And if this were so, are we morally 
required to help gametes create embryos so they can fulfil their interests?  
If it is held that human gametes do not have intrinsic value, they may still possess instrumental 
value. This means that they can have value as tools that we could use to achieve other ends. 
For example, most people resorting to IVF value their gametes not for themselves but as means 
to create a child. If it is true that human gametes only possess instrumental value then we have 
to ask if the value of chimera generated human gametes should be considered inferior to that 
of human-generated human gametes. The answer to this question, however, does not seem 
likely to be positive. Given that instrumental value is task-dependent, we have to assert that the 
instrumental value of chimera-generated human gametes should be assessed by examining how 
they perform as tools for achieving a certain goal. It is in relation to their capacity to achieve 
certain ends that we should judge them as valuable or not. For example, the instrumental value 
of chimera-generated human gametes for human embryonic stem-cell research should be 
assessed by establishing if they achieve the purpose intended by the researchers.  
Given that (a) human gametes do not possess intrinsic value (that could be debased) and that 
(b) they can only possess instrumental value (which is task-dependent), we must conclude that 
the debasement of value argument is found wanting and thus fails to provide moral reasons for 
not creating chimeras-IHGP 
 Chimera human pregnancy 
A third argument against the creation of chimeras-IHGP is that generating them is morally 
problematic because a human, or hybrid, pregnancy could ensue. Even if we accept, for the 
sake of argument, that we should not attempt, or allow, for chimeras to become pregnant with 
a human conceptus, it does not follow from this that we should not create chimeras-IHGP. This 
argument depends on the likelihood of a human or hybrid pregnancy ensuing, and this is a 
practical issue that can be easily dealt with. Henry T. Greely (2013) has proposed five courses 
of action to avoid these scenarios: creating chimeras of only one sex; using chimeras that are 
reproductively immature and euthanizing them before they reach reproductive maturity; 
sterilizing them; euthanizing them if they become pregnant; physically segregating them by 
sex.  
If our intention is to create chimeras-IHGP for their human eggs, then the first course of action 
seems the most appropriate in order to avoid ‘human pregnancies’: we should only create 
female chimeras. This would be the most sensible thing to do given that there is no shortage of 
human sperm for research purposes. In a scenario in which it is desirable to create chimeras 
capable of producing both female and male human gametes, we could just take the appropriate 
measures for them to be segregated by sex. As long as we are reliably capable of avoiding 
human or hybrid pregnancies the strength of this argument is insufficient for ruling out the 
creation of chimeras-IHGP. 
 Animal welfare 
A final argument against the creation, and use, of chimeras-IHGP is that the harms that they 
would be subject to would not be outweighed by the benefits that they would produce; and 
given that nonexistence is not a harm, then we should not create them. In order to address this 
argument, we must first emphasise that the chimeras that we are considering here possess 
animal-proper mental capacities: meaning that they would possess the mental capacities of the 
non-human component. For example, a mouse-human chimera capable of producing human 
eggs would possess mental capacities that are species-typical for mice. This is important if we 
consider that the moral value of human persons, and thus the protections against unwanted 
harmful interventions, is related to their possession of higher cognitive capacities (Palacios-
González, 2016). 
It is true that certain research aims morally justify causing pain, or terminating, certain non-
person sentient animals (e.g. mice). It is also true that other research aims fall short of justifying 
such harms (e.g. developing a new cosmetic eyelash). Also, it is uncontroversial that saving 
people’s lives, or ameliorating people’s great suffering, are aims that justify harming or killing 
certain sentient animals, when there are not other means available to us. Therefore, if the 
research aims for using chimeras-IHGP are geared towards saving people’s lives, or 
ameliorating people’s great suffering, then creating them and later on extracting their human 
eggs is morally justifiable. On the other hand, the moral permissibility of using chimeras-IHGP 
in research that is not geared towards saving people’s lives, or ameliorating people’s great 
suffering, will depend, partially, on the fact if the harms imposed are proportional to the 
expected net benefits (DeGrazia and Sebo, 2015). Discussing, specifically, if it is morally 
permissible to create human/non-human primate chimeras for generating human gametes 
would require much more space than available; see Shaw et al. (2014), Palacios-González 
(2016), and Dondorp et al. (2016) for a recent debate on the creation and use of human/non-
human primate chimeras.  
Two important caveats must be mentioned. First, we should extract the chimera’s eggs in the 
least harmful way possible. Second, if other morally permissible methods were available for 
obtaining human eggs (e.g. in-vitro gametogenesis) that would not require creating and 
experimenting on sentient creatures, then we should choose those other means. Given the 
urgency of the human egg shortage problem, at this point in time we should simultaneously 
explore the chimera route and the in-vitro one, and only give up the former route if the latter 
one, or another one, is capable of adequately dealing with the human egg shortage problem. 
We can confidently assert that the animal welfare argument is not successful in presenting a 
principled argument against creating, and using chimeras-IHGP if other forms of research 
which involve causing harm to non-human animals for the purpose of saving the lives of or 
ameliorating the suffering of people are considered permissible. Indeed, given that research 
aimed at saving people’s lives or ameliorating the great suffering of people is generally deemed 
not only permissible but morally urgent, we can assert that there may in fact be strong moral 
reasons to pursue research into chimeras-IHGP. Even when it is true that the force of this 
positive argument depends on the utility of chimera-produced human gametes, and thus it is 
open to empirical verification, we cannot rule out in principle this research avenue. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have questioned in this paper the morality of a chimera solution to the human 
egg shortage problem. I examined four possible arguments against this option and showed that 
all of them are found wanting. The first concerned the claim that human dignity would be 
violated by the creation of chimeras-IHGP. This argument fails because what would follow, if 
true, is that a creature with dignity would be created. I also pointed out that given that most 
chimeras-IHGP would not possess higher mental capacities then they would not possess human 
dignity in the first place. The second suggested that the value of human gametes would be 
debased and that we should therefore not proceed down this path. This argument also fails 
because human gametes, either generated by humans or chimeras, do not possess intrinsic 
worth capable of being debased. Human gametes only possess instrumental value and this value 
is task-dependent. Third, arguments suggesting that the possibility of a human or hybrid 
pregnancy in fact requires from us not to create such chimeras were considered. These were 
also determined to fail because we can easily and effectively prevent such pregnancies from 
happening by, for example, only creating female chimeras. Lastly, the claim that the aims of 
such experiments do not morally justify creating and using such chimeras was explored. It was 
found, however, that this argument cannot successfully ground a principled case against 
creating and using chimeras-IHGP, because there are certain aims that morally justify harming 
sentient animals, for example saving a person’s life.  
Finally, it was noted that there is a strong moral reason to create and use chimeras-IHGP: 
forwarding research capable of saving people’s lives and ameliorating people’s great suffering. 
Scientists should accept that there is nothing particularly morally problematic with creating 
chimeras-IHGP and should start actively looking into this direction. For a previous in depth 
exploration of the philosophical topics concerning the creation of chimeras-IHGP see Palacios-
González (2015b). 
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